China Planned for the Middle East Crisis and Has Oil Stored

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China, the world’s largest crude oil importer and a powerhouse in global energy consumption, has long prioritized energy security as a cornerstone of its economic and geopolitical strategy. With escalating tensions in the Middle East—a region critical to China’s oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports—Beijing’s foresight in building substantial oil reserves and diversifying its energy mix has positioned it to weather potential supply disruptions. This article examines China’s energy mix, quantifies its oil and LNG imports from the Middle East, compares these to its storage and refining capacities, and assesses how long China could sustain itself in a crisis scenario.

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Please make no mistake, China has its hand around the world, with potential access to shut off much of the U.S. grid as well as controlling backdoors into much of the phones, networking, and electronics sold globally. I have covered this for years, and we are not out of the woods. China relies heavily on the United States to fuel its manufacturing economy, and it is facing a potential slowdown. But with the trading blocs realigning around the world, they may be able to pick up some manufacturing from the UK, the EU, and Canada instead of the United States’ volume. The new trading blocs may include, but not be limited to, India, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, the United States, and even Russia.

Remember: Energy Security starts at home.

China’s Energy Mix: A Balancing Act

China’s energy consumption in 2024 was approximately 16.3 million barrels per day (b/d) of petroleum and other liquid fuels, second only to the United States globally. The country’s energy mix is diverse but heavily reliant on fossil fuels:

Coal: Remains the backbone, accounting for roughly 55-60% of primary energy consumption, though its share is declining due to environmental policies.
Oil: Contributes about 20% to the energy mix, with 74% of consumption met through imports in 2024.
Natural Gas: Makes up around 9% of the energy mix, with LNG and pipeline imports growing to meet industrial and residential demand.
Renewables: China leads globally in renewable capacity, adding 36% of the world’s new renewable generation over the past decade, targeting 90% renewable power by 2060.
Nuclear and Hydropower: These provide stable, low-carbon baseload power, with hydropower at ~15% and nuclear at ~5% of electricity generation.

Despite ambitious renewable goals, China’s reliance on oil and gas imports, particularly from the volatile Middle East, underscores the strategic importance of its storage and crisis planning.

Oil and LNG Imports from the Middle East

In 2023, China imported a record 11.3 million b/d of crude oil, with 44-53% sourced from the Middle East, depending on reporting methodologies. Key suppliers include:

Saudi Arabia: The largest supplier, providing ~15-20% of China’s crude imports (1.7-2.1 million b/d).
Iraq: Supplies ~1.1 million b/d, a significant portion of China’s imports.
Iran: Officially zero due to sanctions, but estimates suggest 0.8-1.4 million b/d via transshipment (e.g., through Malaysia).
Other Gulf States (UAE, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar): Collectively contribute ~1.5-2.0 million b/d.

Total Middle East oil imports are estimated at 4.4-5.8 million b/d, or roughly 40-50% of China’s total crude imports.

For LNG, China imported 78.8 million metric tonnes (Mt) in 2023, with the Middle East, particularly Qatar, playing a smaller but critical role. Qatar supplied 8 Mt, or 10% of China’s LNG imports. Other Middle Eastern LNG exporters (e.g., UAE, Oman) contribute marginally, totaling ~10-12 Mt annually (15% of imports).

Storage Capacities: A Strategic Buffer

China has invested heavily in strategic and commercial oil storage to mitigate supply risks. As of March 31, 2025, China’s crude oil storage included:

Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR): 401 million barrels in above-ground facilities, with an additional 130 million barrels in underground facilities (total ~531 million barrels).
Commercial Stocks: 668 million barrels in above-ground storage.
Total Storage: Approximately 1.18-1.4 billion barrels, with 56% of above-ground capacity filled, leaving room for further stockpiling.

At 2024 import levels (11.1 million b/d), China’s total oil stocks provide ~96-106 days of import coverage. If Middle East supplies (4.4-5.8 million b/d) were disrupted, these stocks could theoretically cover the shortfall for 203-268 days, assuming no other imports or domestic production.

LNG storage is less extensive but growing. China’s LNG storage capacity is estimated at ~25 billion cubic meters (bcm), equivalent to ~18 Mt of LNG. This covers ~80-100 days of Middle East LNG imports (assuming 10-12 Mt annually). However, LNG storage is more decentralized and primarily serves peak winter demand, limiting its strategic role compared to oil.

Refining Capacity: A Bottleneck?

China’s refining capacity is among the world’s largest, processing 14.2 million b/d in 2024, down from a peak of 14.8 million b/d in 2023 due to slower demand growth. Refineries are concentrated in coastal provinces, with major players like Sinopec and CNPC pivoting toward petrochemicals to offset declining gasoline and diesel demand.

In a Middle East crisis, China’s refining capacity exceeds its Middle East oil imports (4.4-5.8 million b/d), allowing it to process stored crude without immediate constraints. However, prolonged disruptions could strain smaller, independent “teapot” refineries reliant on Iranian crude, which processed ~0.8-1.4 million b/d in 2024.

How Long Can China Last?

To assess China’s resilience, consider a worst-case scenario: a complete Middle East supply cutoff (4.4-5.8 million b/d of oil, 10-12 Mt of LNG annually).

Oil

Storage Coverage: China’s 1.18-1.4 billion barrels could cover 4.4-5.8 million b/d for 203-268 days.
Alternative Supplies:
- Russia: Supplied 2.2 million b/d in 2024 and could increase by 0.5-1 million b/d via pipelines (e.g., Power of Siberia).
- Domestic Production: Averaged 4.3 million b/d in 2024, with potential to boost by ~0.5 million b/d.
- Other Sources (Brazil, Canada, Central Asia): Could add 1-1.5 million b/d via pipelines and sea routes.
Mitigation: Combined, these sources could replace 2.5-3.5 million b/d, leaving a shortfall of 1-3.3 million b/d. At this rate, reserves would last 357-1,400 days (1-4 years), assuming demand remains static.
Demand Reduction: China could reduce oil consumption by prioritizing new energy vehicles (NEVs), LNG trucks, and rail, which avoided 1.2 million b/d of demand growth since 2019. This could extend reserves further.

LNG

Storage Coverage: 18 Mt of LNG storage covers 80-100 days of Middle East imports (10-12 Mt/year).
Alternative Supplies: Russia and Australia, major LNG suppliers, could offset Qatar’s 8 Mt via existing contracts. Central Asian pipelines (e.g., Turkmenistan) delivered 47.9 bcm (~35 Mt LNG equivalent) in 2019 and could expand.
Mitigation: LNG is less critical than oil, and China’s coal-heavy power sector provides a fallback. A shortfall would primarily affect industrial users, with reserves and alternatives covering 6-12 months.

Conclusions: Prepared but Not Invulnerable

China’s strategic foresight—evident in its massive oil reserves, diversified import sources, and robust refining capacity—positions it to withstand a Middle East crisis far better than most import-dependent nations. Its 1.18-1.4 billion barrels of oil stocks, bolstered by domestic production and alternative suppliers like Russia, could sustain the economy for 1-4 years under a partial supply disruption, assuming adaptive measures like demand reduction. LNG reserves, while smaller, provide a 3-12 month buffer, with coal and pipeline gas as fallbacks.

However, vulnerabilities remain. A prolonged Strait of Hormuz blockade, disrupting 25% of global oil and 20% of LNG trade, could strain China’s logistics and smaller refineries. Geopolitical risks, such as U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil transshipments, could complicate access to discounted crude. Moreover, China’s economic growth, projected to slow in 2025-2026, may reduce demand flexibility, increasing reliance on reserves.

Beijing’s “prepare for the worst” mindset, reflected in its Belt and Road pipelines and SPR expansion, demonstrates a calculated approach to energy security. Yet, as Middle East tensions persist, China must balance its renewable ambitions with the reality of its fossil fuel dependence, ensuring its economic engine remains resilient through any storm. And compare that to the United States’ use of our Strategic Oil Reserve by the Biden Administration to fund a corrupt election. China looks at management in decades, and we can not get past the next election.

As stated above, “Energy Security starts at home” has a multi-faceted meaning. For China, energy security is taken very seriously, and as Americans, we need to prepare from the start. Our leaders have been implementing a national grid structure that is under attack, and it has some serious potential problems looming in the short term. Both through the overuse of unreliable wind and solar, with security holes from China, and the decommissioning of reliable coal and natural gas plants. Couple that with the lack of funding and regulatory hurdles in the past for nuclear energy, and you arrive at the current grid problems left for the Trump Administration to address. Fortunately for Americans, we have the single best team working for the United States citizens in Secretary Chris Wright, Burgham, and Zelden.

I also stand by my earlier statements. As American men, we need to be prepared for grid failures and crises to protect our homes and our neighbors, rather than relying on the government to bail us out. They may not show up, and the more people who can help their neighbors, the better off America will be. We will see, over the next few years, the development of microgrids and a decentralized grid starting to roll out. Stay tuned for articles and information on the changing grid management and energy safety.

Disclaimer: Calculations are based on available data and assumptions about static demand and supply responses. Actual outcomes in a crisis would depend on dynamic factors, including global market reactions and China’s policy adaptations.