[[{“value”:”
The combination of ongoing Russian aggression and Trump’s return to the White House puts European defence under historic pressure, Russia can hope to benefit not only from the president-elect’s desire to swiftly end the war in Ukraine but also from the expected weakening of US commitment to European security, writes Pierre Haroche.
Pierre Haroche, associate professor of European and International Politics, Catholic University of Lille.
The risk is that President Putin will seize this opportunity to become even more aggressive and domineering, seeing Europe as more easily exploitable.
Whatever the outcome of Trump’s future diplomatic initiatives, it is clear that Europeans will soon face an unprecedented test, whether they have to support the continuation of the Ukrainian war effort with no or less US aid or guarantee Ukraine’s security after a hypothetical freezing of the conflict. For example, some members of Trump’s team have hinted that he would want European, not US troops, to be deployed to Ukraine as peacekeepers on a future ceasefire line. Against this backdrop, most European leaders agree on the need for some kind of new defence initiative, and the only question is what form this could take.
Some are calling for an increase in national defence spending from the recommended 2% to 3% of GDP to buy more battle tanks and fighter aircraft. However, the limits of this method are well known. Some states will continue to free-ride or to invoke budgetary difficulties to under-invest. Those states that do invest will do so in different, non-mutually compatible models or will buy off the shelf from outside Europe, thus considerably weakening the potential for economies of scale and incentives for the European industry to increase its production capacity. The military and political effects are likely to be slow at best.
A second option is to focus on the joint procurement of expensive strategic capabilities for which Europeans overwhelmingly depend on US forces, such as military satellites, airborne surveillance, transport aircraft and ballistic missile defence systems. While this approach is more promising in terms of cooperation, the problem is that these are medium-term projects that cannot directly respond to the urgency of the situation in Ukraine.
Finally, a third option is to focus — at least initially — on the most pressing needs for expendable equipment, such as artillery shells, drones and missiles. Ukraine will always need these, whether to continue the war or to deter a new Russian attack, and NATO’s European pillar will also need them to be able to counter Russia with a credible, combat-ready line of defence.
From an industrial point of view, this equipment can also be produced quickly. Ukraine, for example, is now capable of producing millions of drones annually. Besides, unlike major combat platforms such as tanks and jets, where incompatible systems compete, these weapons are relatively interchangeable, making it easier for Europeans to purchase them jointly.
While the massive, rapid and joint acquisition of expendable weapons would be the most concrete and effective response to the twofold challenge posed to Europe by Putin and Trump, the question remains of how to effect this acquisition. The slow and disappointing results of the EU’s plan to buy artillery shells so far have highlighted the shortcomings of the purely intergovernmental approach. The orders placed have been scattered and limited in scale, thus failing to effectively mobilise the industry.
The shock of Trump’s return to the US presidency should be the occasion for a qualitative leap in European defence integration. Only the creation of a European defence budget would be up to this task.
The aim would be to create a common pot to finance a multiannual procurement programme for ammunition, drones and missiles. This could take the form of an EU permanent structured cooperation project, which would not require all member states to participate. Contracts would be negotiated by a single authority, such as the European Defence Agency. This model would correspond to the proposal made in February 2023 by Kaja Kallas to reproduce in the area of armaments the logic of the joint procurement of COVID-19 vaccines.
Such centralisation of decisions would give the industry longer-term visibility and encourage it to increase its production capacity massively and rapidly. A substantial common defence budget would also be the clearest signal Europeans could send to Trump that they are finally taking their defence funding obligations seriously.
Finally, how can this budget be financed? The existential nature of the present security challenge amply justifies the joint issue of European debt. If fiscal rectitude leads Europe into geopolitical servitude, it will be of little use to our children.
We give you energy news and help invest in energy projects too, click here to learn more
Crude Oil, LNG, Jet Fuel price quote
ENB Top News
ENB
Energy Dashboard
ENB Podcast
ENB Substack
The post With Trump back, it’s time for a European defence budget appeared first on Energy News Beat.
“}]]